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World labor mobility costs
Wage dynamics
Employment dynamicsEstimates of labor mobility costs are needed to assess the responses of employment and wages to trade shocks
when factor adjustment is costly. Availablemethods to estimate those costs rely on panel data, which are seldom
available in developing countries. We propose a method to estimate mobility costs using readily obtainable data
worldwide. Our estimator matches the changes in observed sectoral employment allocations with the predicted
allocations from amodel of costly labor adjustment.We estimate a worldmap of labormobility costs andwe use
those estimates to explore the response of labor markets to trade policy.
© 2014 Published by Elsevier B.V.1. Introduction
Labor market frictions, such as moving costs, firing–hiring costs, or
sector-specific skills, make labor adjustment typically costly.1 In this
setting, a trade shock will only induce a gradual response of wages
and employment and this pattern of sluggish labor adjustment hasThe detailed comments of two
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ni and Porto, 2010).important welfare implications.2 The assessment of these labor market
responses requires estimates of the costs of labor mobility, but these
estimates are seldom available in developing countries. In this paper,
our aim is to create a map of estimates of labor mobility costs across
the developing world and to use these estimates to explore labor
market responses to trade shocks.
We set up a dynamic model of sectoral employment choices andwe
estimate it for a large sample of developing countries. We adopt the
labor adjustment analytical framework of Artuc et al. (2010), where
workers can move across sectors (e.g., in response to wage differences)
at a cost. This cost has a common and an idiosyncratic component. The
common component captures the average mobility cost of a labor mar-
ket friction, while the idiosyncratic cost captures worker-specific costs.
The parameters governing these costs can only be estimated with
panel data, which are hard to find in developing countries.3 To2 The estimation of the impacts of trade liberalization in the presence of imperfect labor
mobility is a major ongoing theme in the recent trade literature. Structural models of the
dynamics of costly labor adjustment following trade policy and trade shocks include Artuc
et al. (2008, 2010), Coşar (2013), Coşar et al. (2013), Davidson and Matusz (2000, 2004a,
2004b, 2006a, 2006b, 2010), Dix-Carneiro (2014), and Kambourov (2009).
3 Panel data provide information on the level of the gross employment flows (which
identify the average mobility cost) and on the responsiveness of those flows to the ob-
served wage differentials (which identifies the idiosyncratic component).
29E. Artuc et al. / Journal of International Economics 95 (2015) 28–41overcome this limitation, we adapt themodel and propose a novel esti-
mation strategy (a minimum distance estimator) that requires only a
time series of cross-sections of sectoral employment and wages—more
easily obtainable data. Without the gross flows from the panels, we use
net flows to identify the common mobility cost by matching the
response of those flows to observed wage differences. We also need to
impose a normalization of the idiosyncratic costs. This normalization
turns out to be appropriate because ourmodel allows for utility compen-
sating differentials across sectors and also because our estimates are ro-
bust to small departures from this normalization. In the end,we generate
a robust cross-country pattern of mobility costs caused by labor market
frictions. This allows us to assess the responses to trade shocks in the
presence of costly labor adjustment in a wide array of countries.
We use the United Nations Industrial Development Organization
(UNIDO) database, which provides information on labor allocations and
wages in themanufacturing sector, to estimate amapof the labormobility
costs for 25 developed countries and 31 developing countries. We
estimate large costs of labor mobility. On average, the labor mobility
costs in developing countries are equivalent to 3.71 times the annual
wage. In the developed countries, themobility costs are 2.76 times the an-
nual wage—much lower, as expected. The highest costs are estimated in
Sub-Saharan Africa (4.00), Eastern Europe and Central Asia (3.95), South
Asia (3.88), Middle East and North Africa (3.59), East Asia and the Pacific
(3.46), and LatinAmerica (3.23). Labormobility costs are negatively corre-
lated with per capita GDP and positively correlated with less-developed,
low-quality labormarkets. Themobility costs are also positively correlated
with other frictions, distortions and constraints in the economy.
To illustrate how our estimates of labor mobility costs can be used
for policy analysis, we run simulations of the labor market responses
to trade liberalization. For each developing country, we separately
explore the impacts of a hypothetical decrease in the prices of Food
and Beverages and Textiles (due to a worldwide decline in food de-
mand, for instance). The magnitude of the labor mobility costs matters
for the responses of these economies to such a trade shock. Typically,
countries only reach close to the steady state after 6 years and the
higher the mobility costs are, the longer this transition takes. This im-
perfect adjustment is costly. We estimatemeasures of trade adjustment
costs and these estimates vary widely across countries. On average, the
costs of adjustment to a trade shock in the food sector are as high as
the actual welfare impacts caused by that shock. The median cost of
adjustment is roughly half the actual welfare effects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
structural model of labor mobility costs and, Section 3 discusses the
estimation algorithm and the identification mechanism. The mapping of
the estimates of the labor mobility costs is in Section 4. Section 5
assesses the identification assumptions of our model and the potential
biases created by violations of those assumptions. Section 6 presents the
simulations of the impacts of trade shocks. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2. A model of labor mobility costs
Our model of labor mobility costs is based on Artuc et al. (2010).
There are N sectors in the economy, M manufacturing sectors and one
non-manufacturing sector.4 Sector i produces a good using labor Li and
a specific factor (such as capital or land) with the following technology
Qit ¼ Fi L it ; st
 
; ð1Þ
where st captures the overall state of the economy at time t. The state
variable summarizes the role of shocks to prices, technology, policies,
and to the specific factor. For estimation purposes, because of the4 In other settings, this “residual” sector could also include unemployment or informal-
ity. See our discussion below.aggregate nature of our data, we will assume that workers have perfect
foresight so that they can make perfect predictions of the evolution of
st (see Section 3). With more detailed data, as in Artuc et al. (2010),
the model can accommodate first order Markov processes for
st. For presentational purposes, we keep a general notation in this
section, and simplify the formulas for the case of perfect foresight in
the estimation section. Firms are homogeneous and choose employment
tomaximize profits. The representative firm hires labor Lti so as to equal-
ize the equilibriumwage with the value of themarginal product of labor
wit ¼ pit




where wti is the wage in sector i and pti is the price of good i.
At a given timeperiod, each agent is employed in a sector andearns the
sectoralmarketwage. At the end of each time period t, the agent chooses a
sector of employment for the next period, t+1. If the utility differential is
larger than the cost of moving, the workers move. This determines a new
vector of equilibrium labor allocations. We can then estimate the key
moving cost parameters by matching the employment predictions of the
model with the employment allocations observed in the data.
Aworker employed in sector i at time t earns the current sector specif-
ic wagewti and enjoys a sector specific (utility) effect denoted by ηi. Total
instantaneous utility is thus uti = wti + ηi. These ηi can be interpreted as
compensating differentials across sectors. Both wti and ηi are common to
all workers in a given sector so that there is no worker heterogeneity.5
The agent observes both w and η, but only w is observed in the data.
At the end of each time period t, the agent chooses the next period
sector of employment based on the expected stream of future wages
(which depends on the state variable st) and on the moving costs. The
cost of choosing alternative j for agent l who is currently in sector i is
C + ε tj,l. The “moving cost” has two components, a deterministic part,
C, common to all agents, and a random part, ε tj,l, specific to agent l.
Each worker thus faces a vector of moving costs ε tl. All agents are iden-
tical except for their individual moving cost shocks εtl and their current
sector. Hence, the state of each agent can be summarized by his/her
sector i, the vector of shocks ε tl and the aggregate state st (which,
under perfect foresight as in the estimation section, is known). We
assume that C = 0 if agents stay in their current sector. At the end of
time t, the random component of the “moving cost,” ε tj,l, is revealed.
Agents are risk neutral, have rational expectations and a commondis-
count factor β b 1. Let Ui(st, εtl) be the present discounted choice-specific
utility of agent l currently employed in sector i. The Bellman equation is
















where 1i ≠ j is the indicator function equal to 1 if i ≠ j, i.e. if the agent
moves, and zero otherwise. Note that, in Eq. (3), the workers take
expectations, Et,ε, at time t over the idiosyncratic shocks εt + 1 as well
as on the state st + 1.
We now need to solve the model to compute the equilibrium flows
ofworkers across sectors. This solution delivers employment allocations
for all sectors i and periods t, and we can thus recover the structural
parameters by matching the employment solution of the model with
the employment levels observed in the data, our task in Section 3. To
find the solution, let Vj(st) be the expected value of U, conditional on
the vector of idiosyncratic shocks ε tl, i.e.,Vj(st)= EεUj(st, εtl). Take expec-
tations of Eq. (3) with respect to agent specific shocks to get









: ð4Þ5 As explained below, we work only with aggregate data, and therefore this is an un-
avoidable assumption. Dix-Carneiro (2014) introduces worker heterogeneity in a related
structural model of labor mobility costs.
6 These methods also estimate C = 1.762, and we exploit this below to further assess
our estimator (in Section 5). We also show in Section 5 and in the Online Appendix to
thepaper that this normalization ofν turns out to be appropriate for our purposes. TheOn-
line Appendix can be found at www.https://sites.google.com/site/guidoportounlp/.
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tion for the idiosyncratic shocks ε. As it is standard in discrete choice
model, we assume that ε is distributed iid extreme value type I
with location parameter − νγ, scale parameter ν, and cdf F(ε) =
exp(−exp(−ε/ν−γ)),where E(ε)=0,Var(ε)=π2ν2/6 andγ is Euler's
constant. This assumption simplifies the Bellman equation andmakes it
tractable (McFadden, 1973).
We can now derive the employment allocations implied by the
model. Let mtij be the ratio of agents who switch from sector i to sector
j. This can be interpreted as gross flows from i to j, or the probability
of choosing j conditional on i. The total number of agents moving from
i to j is equal to ytij = Ltimtij, where Lti is the number of agents who are
in i at time t. Under the extreme value distributional assumption, the
gross flow mtij can be written as

















   ð5Þ
for i≠ j. For workers that stay, 1i ≠ jC=0 so thatmtii= exp((EtVt + 1j )/ν)/
∑k = 1K exp((EtVt + 1k )/ν).
We can also write the ex-ante value function as
V i stð Þ ¼ wit þ ηi þ βEtV i stþ1
 þΩi stð Þ; ð6Þ
where Ω(st)i is the option value for workers in sector i (the ex-ante
value of switching sectors). With perfect foresight, this simplifies to
Vi(st) = wti + η i + βVi(st + 1) + Ω i(st).




mk j stð ÞLkt þmjj stð ÞL jt : ð7Þ
There are four key pieces in the model: the common mobility costs,
C, the variance of the idiosyncratic mobility costs, ν, the compensating
differentials, ηi, and the wage differentials. At each time period, workers
compare the costs and benefits of changing employment sector. The
benefits are given by the utility differentials, that is the wage differen-
tials net of the compensating differentials. The workers move when
the utility differentials are larger than the mobility costs, inclusive of
the idiosyncratic benefits. In the end, given the utility differentials,
the flow of workers across sectors depends on C and ν, which are the
parameters that we want to estimate.
3. Estimation
Our goal in this paper is to create the most comprehensive map of
estimates of labor mobility costs possible. Artuc et al. (2010) derive
the estimators of these mobility costs based on panel data. The panels
are used to build measures of gross employment flows across sectors
that, together with utility compensating differentials, identify C, ν, and
ηi. In many countries, where the needed panel data is not available,
this approach cannot be implemented. For many of these countries,
there is availability of time series of sector-level employment and
wages, for example in the UNIDO database. In this section, we derive
the estimators of themobility costs based on this readily available data.
3.1. The UNIDO data
It is convenient to begin with a description of the data, because the
available data imposes some restrictions on the estimation algorithm. In
the analysis, we use INDSTAT4, the UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database
for the period 1986–2007. The dataset provides information on the num-
ber of establishments, number of employees, wages, output, value added,
and gross fixed capital formation. For our purposes, we need informationon employment andwages for the estimation and also on value added for
the simulations (see Section 6 below). From these data, we build series
for the wage streams wti and for the labor allocations Lti, for sector i at
time t. For the estimation, we aggregate the data into eight major sectors,
namely Metals & Minerals, Chemicals & Petroleum Products, Machinery,
Food & Beverages, Wood Products, Textiles & Clothing, Miscellaneous
Equipments, and Motor Vehicles. The UNIDO data has a good coverage
of the manufacturing sector but does not cover the non-manufacturing
sector. To overcome this limitation, we use national account data to con-
struct measures of labor allocations in the non-manufacturing sector,
which we label as sector 1. Note that we do not observe wages for the
non-manufacturing sector. In the end, our data comprises time series of
employment allocations for both non-manufacturers andmanufacturers,
Lt
1 and Lti, and wages for manufacturers, wti. Wages (utilities) in the non-
manufacturing sector, ut1, will be calibrated from the data.
3.2. The estimator
We propose a simulation estimator where we compare the labor
allocations simulated with our structural model with the labor alloca-
tions observed in the data. Concretely, we define a minimum distance
estimator that matches changes in employment allocations for all the







ωit eLitþ1 C; η;u1 −eLit C; η;u1  − Litþ1−Lit  2;
ð8Þ
where eL jt are the employment prediction of the model and ωti are
weights used for efficiency. The minimization search is done over C,
the vector of η for themanufacturing sectors, and the time vector of util-
ities for the non-manufacturing sector u1 = [u11, …, uT1]. Identification
depends on the response of employment allocations towage differences
in the data. Before discussing identification issues in detail below, we
need to talk about the implementation of the estimator.
Note first that the nature of our cross-section data imposes some re-
strictions on the parameters we can estimate. In particular, given the
data on employment allocation, and thus the lack of data on gross
flows, we can only identify C/ν, the ratio of the common mobility cost
C and the variance of the utility shocks ν, but we cannot separately
identify these parameters. To pin down C, we plug in the best possible
estimate of ν. To obtain it, we work with the CPS micro-data with
detailed wage information as well as gross labor flows and employ the
method used in Artuc and McLaren (2014) and Artuc, Bet, Brambilla,
and Porto (2014). This paper adds sectoral utility fixed effects and uti-
lize maximum likelihood methods applied to conditional choice proba-
bility models. If we use these MLE methods with the U.S. CPS data, the
estimate for the baseline is ν = 0.60.6
Second, we need an assumption about the formation of workers' ex-
pectations regarding the state of the economy st. The state s captures
various aggregate shocks in the economy, including technology shocks,
policies, and price shocks. Again, given the limitations of our data, we
impose a perfect foresight assumption, namely Etsτ = sτ for any τ ≥ t,
so that there is no aggregate uncertainty. We also assume that the
state of the economy remains constant after T, the last year in the
UNIDO data, so that sT + x = sT, for x N 0 and the optimization problem
ends at T. These assumptions, which imply that workers make perfect
predictions about the wage stream, are useful because they save us
from solving the expectationsnumerically in the Bellman equations em-
bedded in the minimization algorithm. More concretely, we have that
EtV
i(st + 1) = V i(st + 1), so that we can solve the system of values Vti
31E. Artuc et al. / Journal of International Economics 95 (2015) 28–41for t=1,…, T from Eq. (6). It is important to note that the predictions of
themodel can depart from the data even with perfect foresight because
of the randomness of the idiosyncratic utility shocks. In fact, if the
manufacturing sector is small, as it often is in our target countries,
then ε can account for significant deviations of the model. If we instead
wanted to accommodate aggregate shocks to st, such as iid or first order
Markov shocks, we run into two problems. We do not have sufficient
information in the data to specify the nature of these shocks (i.e., the
variance or the transition probabilities). More importantly, even under
arbitrary assumptions about the aggregate shocks, the computational
burden would make our estimation unfeasible.7 In addition, with
perfect foresight, there is no need to specify functional forms for the
production functions. The wages observed in the data are equilibrium
wages (so that the wage is equal to the marginal product of labor for
given production functions). The stream of wages thus convey all the
information about the economy that the workers need, together with
the expected idiosyncratic shocks, to make the best moving decision for
different C.8 We carefully assess the implications of these assumptions
with Monte Carlo simulations and with micro-data analysis in Section 5.
Finally, in order to simplify the numerical search given the large
number of parameters and the limited data, we find the utility differen-
tials {ut1} and the compensating differentials η i that simultaneously
solve the following system of equations:
eL1t u1;η;C=ν  ¼ L1t ; ð9Þ





eLit u1;η;C=ν  ¼ 1TXt Lit ; ð10Þ
where T is the number of time periods in the data. This is a calibration
procedure where we match {ut1} and η such that the predictions of the
model match both the whole time series of non-manufacturing sector
labor allocations and the average employment for each sector i. The
vectors u1 and η are re-calibrated in each step of the minimization
search. In this step of the procedure, our estimator has a flavor similar
to the estimator in Goolsbee and Petrin (2004) in the sense that they
match micro-data to recover the parameters and aggregate moments
to recover the fixed-effects. The key difference is that Goolsbee and
Petrin have much more detailed disaggregated data and thus can
estimate rather than calibrate the fixed-effects, as we do here.
To implement the estimator, we start with guesses for the mobility
costs, C, the compensating differentials for the manufacturing sectors,
ηi, and the utility differentials for the non-manufacturing sector, {ut1}.
Given these guesses, we solve the model. We calculate the values
Vt
i, Vt1 using Eq. (6) and the gross flows, mt
ij and, with them, we predict




where eLi1 ¼ Li1 for t= 1. These predictions are then compared with the
data and the guesses are updated until convergence. The guesses for η i7 For the estimation and simulation of the model, we use streamlined Fortran algo-
rithms to increase the speed of computations. In some experiments we runwith arbitrary
aggregate shocks, it can take weeks of computing time to find the C thatminimizes Eq. (8).
8 Note that the structure of the economy could be different (production functions could
be CES instead of Cobb–Douglas), but we would estimate the same Cs we are reporting.
With alternative assumptions about expectations or shocks, such as iid shocks or
AR(1) shocks, this separation between estimation and simulation may not be achieved.
If so, then the estimation would require simulation, which in turn would require some
knowledge about the nature of the aggregate shocks and would also require us to fully
specify the structure of the economy. For the simulation of section 6, however, it will be
necessary to specify the functional form of the production and demand functions. See also
Artuc et al. (2010) for a thorough discussion.and {ut1} are updated with the calibration step. The guess for C is up-
dated with the numerical minimization of Eq. (8), conditional on the
updated ηi and {ut1}.9 To achieve efficiency, the model is estimated in
two steps. We first use the identity matrix as the weighting matrix
and we then plug in the residuals from this step in ω ti.
The variance of C can be derived following straightforward asymp-










be the predicted employment









where eitþ1 ¼ Λ itþ1−Λ̂ itþ1 Cð Þ is the residual. In the Online Appendix, we



























where n is the total number of observations, summing across sectors i
and time t. This variance has to be calculated numerically, because we
need numerical estimates of the first and second derivatives of Λ̂ .
3.3. Identification
The intuition underneath our estimator is simple. The structure of
ourmodel dictates how agentsmakemoving decisions based on current
employment allocations, on expectations about idiosyncratic shocks,
and on other parameters such as production functions (which deter-
mine wage responses), price index weights, and technology (also as-
suming perfect foresight of aggregate shocks). These decisions depend
on C. Given all the parameters of the economy, including the calibrated
η's and u1, our procedure chooses C in order to match the observed
changes in sectoral employment with the predicted changes in sectoral
employment. We can illustrate how well the model works by plotting
these matches for one country. We do this for Colombia, which, as we
show in Section 4 below, has Ĉ = 3.96 (a relatively high C). In the top
panel of Fig. 1, we show that the model fits quite well for Colombia
(as it does for all other countries in our sample).
We can further explore the mechanics of our model in the data.
Given the parameters of the model, and given C, the workers compute
the value of being employed in each sector i. They move if the benefits
from moving (the differences in values) dominate the costs of moving
(the C plus any idiosyncratic cost). The model thus implies, given C, a
positive correlation between changes in employment and worker's
value differences.10 To show this in the Colombian case,we run a regres-
sion of the observed differences in employment changes in the data and
the differences inworkers' values predicted by ourmodel (given the es-
timated C). We plot the OLS slope in the bottom panel of Fig. 1. Under
the estimated C for Colombia, the OLS slope is 0.0006, with a t-statistic
of 6.89; this is the solid line in the Figure. This illustrates the mechanics
of our model.
We can also inspect what this correlation looks like under alterna-
tive mobility costs. The model can create a spuriously large correlation
between employment changes and value differences if C is lower than
the estimated C (because workers will reallocate more, ceteris paribus,
when the true value of C is low). Conversely, the model can produce a9 Note that this means that the calibration is done in each step of the minimization
search.
10 It is important to note that the model compares differences in sector's values rather
than simple wage differences, because workers internalize wage dynamics as well as the
option value of moving. In fact, the correlation between wage differences alone and labor
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A) Goodness of fit
B) Model Mechanisms
Fig. 1.Model identification. Notes. The top panel (Panel A) shows the goodness offit of the
model. The plots reveal a high correlation between employment changes and predicted
employment changes (by the model). The bottom panel (Panel B) shows the model's
mechanism. The graph displays the OLS slope of a regression of employment changes
and predicted value changes for different Cs. Estimated C = 3.96, solid line; Low-C =












Jordan 5.07 0.97 Iran 3.24 0.22
Philippines 5.06 0.64 Bolivia 3.2 0.34
Bangladesh 4.89 0.14 Hungary 3.16 0.77
Mauritania 4.79 0.26 Romania 3 0.47
Bulgaria 4.67 2.3 Sweden 3 0.56
Ukraine 4.62 0.3 Italy 2.95 0.67
Latvia 4.58 0.29 Syrian Arab Republic 2.94 0.2
Ethiopia 4.52 0.05 El Salvador 2.93 0.3
Azerbaijan 4.47 0.78 Czech Republic 2.92 0.75
Cameroon 4.2 0.01 Kazakhstan 2.88 0.3
Georgia 4.02 0.69 India 2.87 0.17
Lithuania 4 0.44 Mongolia 2.82 0.05
Colombia 3.96 0.42 Belgium 2.81 0.41
Costa Rica 3.83 0.37 Slovenia 2.76 2.01
Senegal 3.83 0.02 China 2.75 0.35
Australia 3.77 0.16 Trinidad and Tobago 2.74 0.57
Korea 3.77 0.99 South Africa 2.68 0.37
United Kingdom 3.72 0.37 Poland 2.66 0.33
Malta 3.61 0.34 Singapore 2.57 1.99
Ecuador 3.59 0.25 Norway 2.52 0.3
France 3.59 0.19 United States 2.21 0.53
Spain 3.54 0.41 Argentina 2.13 0.12
Chile 3.47 0.78 Ireland 2.02 1.09
Indonesia 3.46 0.33 Austria 1.9 0.29
Egypt 3.4 0.5 Netherlands 1.82 1.49
Oman 3.29 0.13 Germany 1.7 0.76
Russia 3.28 0.17 Finland 1.43 0.35
Denmark 3.25 0.44 Estonia 1.29 0.26
Notes: Estimates of labor mobility costs C using UNIDO data.
32 E. Artuc et al. / Journal of International Economics 95 (2015) 28–41low correlation if C is artificially high (because workers will reallocate
less, ceteris paribus, when the true C is high). To show this, we simulate
predictions of themodel for Colombia under the limiting cases of almost
costless labor mobility (C = 0.5) and almost prohibitively costly labor
mobility (C = 20). With almost costless mobility, a given difference in
value creates excessive labor mobility. The OLS slope is 0.003 with a
t-statistic of 6.69—the long-dashed steepest line at the bottom, panel
B, in Fig. 1. In addition, the correlation between workers' value differ-
ences and labor reallocation disappears entirely when C is prohibitively
high. The OLS slope is − 3.39e − 06, and the t-statistic of −0.26—the
short-dashed, almost horizontal line in Fig. 1. Clearly, in both cases,
the model mismatches the employment changes of the data.11
4. A mapping of world mobility costs
Table 1 shows the estimates of the labor mobility costs for 56 coun-
tries around the world and Fig. 2 shows themap of labor mobility costs.
Table 2 reports averages for different groups of countries. For all the11 Moreover, we can show that the objective function is minimized when C= 3.96 (see
Online Appendix).countries in the world, the average C is 3.29. This means that, when
moving across sectors, the workers face a common utility cost that is
equivalent to 3.29 times the annual average wage in the economy. In
general, developing countries showhigher Cs than developed countries.
On average, the mobility cost is 2.76 for developed countries and 3.71
for developing countries. The lowest estimated costs are in Estonia,
Finland, and Germany; the highest costs are in Jordan, Philippines,
Bangladesh, and Mauritania. Fig. 3 shows the distribution of C. As
expected, the density for developing countries lies to the right of the
one for developed countries. In addition, there is a much larger
dispersion in C across developing countries. The density for developed
countries is more concentrated.
To explore differences in C, we report averages for countries by
region and by income levels. The lowest labor mobility costs are in
North America, 2.21, and in Western Europe, 2.61. In developing coun-
tries, the highest average estimated Cs are for Sub-Saharan Africa
(4.00), Eastern Europe & Central Asia (3.95), South Asia (3.88), Middle
East & North Africa (3.59), East Asia & the Pacific (3.46), and Latin
America (3.23). When countries are grouped by income level, the esti-
mated costs are 2.70 in High income OECD countries, and 3.05 in High
income, non-OECD countries. The highest average C, at 4.70, is in Low
income countries. The mobility cost in lower middle income countries
is 3.70 and in upper middle income countries, 3.60.
We can also explore some correlates of the labor mobility costs. We
do this by plotting simple bivariate non-parametric regressions
between various country characteristics and the size of the estimated
mobility costs. We present here only a few representative results and
provide a full set of correlations in the Online Appendix. No causality
is implied by this analysis, only simple correlations. Data on these corre-
lates are from the World Development Indicators, and they represent
averages for the period 1995–2007.
Panel A) in Fig. 4 describes the correlation between the mobility
costs and country well-being. As expected, richer countries, in terms
of per capita GDP, tend to show lower mobility costs. In the Online Ap-






Fig. 2. A mapping of labor mobility costs. Notes: Estimates of labor mobility costs C using UNIDO data.
33E. Artuc et al. / Journal of International Economics 95 (2015) 28–41poverty head-count and the poverty gap. Panel B) documents a positive
correlation between the mobility costs and vulnerable employment
conditions. More generally, labor mobility costs tend to be higher in
countries with less-developed and low-quality labor markets. Finally,
we plot in Panel C) of Fig. 4 the correlationswith other indicators of con-
straints and distortions. It is not surprising to find an overall positive
correlation between the mobility costs and the number of procedures
needed to enforce a contract, or the number of days required to export.
This means that labor market rigidities are more prevalent in countries
where other types of rigidities and distortions are also present.
5. Identification assumptions and potential biases
The estimator has twomain sources of bias. First, to solve themodel,
we need to assume perfect foresight. Unexpected aggregate shocks to
the economy, such as labor supply shocks, large domestic macro-
shocks, or shocks affecting international markets, can thus bias our esti-
mates of the mobility costs. Second, unobserved heterogeneity can alsoTable 2
Labor mobility costs descriptive statistics.
Observations Mean Standard error
(1) (2) (3)
All countries 56 3.29 0.91
Developed 25 2.76 0.75
Developing 31 3.71 0.81
By region
Western Europe 18 2.61 0.75
North America 1 2.21
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 9 3.95 0.72
South Asia 2 3.88 1.4
Latin America & Caribbean 8 3.23 0.61
East Asia & Pacific 7 3.46 0.86
Middle East & North Africa 6 3.59 0.76
Sub-Saharan Africa 5 4 0.82
By income group
High income OECD 21 2.7 0.78
High income non-OECD 4 3.05 0.48
Upper middle income 16 3.6 0.83
Lower middle income 13 3.7 0.78
Low income 2 4.7 0.26
Note: Average of labor mobility costs C for different groups of countries.create potential biases (Dix-Carneiro, 2014; Lee and Wolpin, 2006). If
workers are different, self-selection based on those differences can
make the expected wage in a sector to be a poor predictor of the wage
potentially offered to workers employed in other sectors. For example,
if the wage in sector j actually offered to a worker in sector i is lower
than the average observed wage used by our estimator (because of
unobserved attributes such as skills specific to sector j), then labor re-
allocation can be small even with large average wage differences. As a
result, our estimate of C can be spuriously large. An additional concern
is the lack of data on wages in the non-tradable sector in the UNIDO
data. This reduces the degrees of freedom in our data and can introduce
noise in the estimation. Finally, we need to examine the implications of
our normalization of ν and the fact that we cannot estimate C and ν
separately.
This section presents a comprehensive assessment of the potential
biases of the estimates. We do this in steps. We begin with an assess-
ment based on simulations of our model. We then assess the same
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Fig. 3. Density of mobility costs. Notes: Estimates of labor mobility costs C using UNIDO
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kernel = epanechnikov, degree = 0, bandwidth = .78
A) Country Well-Being B) Features of Labor Markets
C) Other Distortions: costs of doing business and time to export (in days)
Fig. 4.Correlates ofmobility costs. Notes. Correlations of estimates of labormobility costs Cwith: A)per capitaGDP; B) the share of vulnerable employment (proxy for less-developed, low-
quality labor markets); C) number of procedures needed to enforce a contract and time required to export.
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We can learn some of the properties of our estimator with Monte
Carlo simulations. The basic structure of our Monte Carlo experiments
is simple. We simulate the model N = 500 times using C = 2.212 and
ν = 0.60. These correspond to the U.S. estimates, which we use here
for consistency with the micro-data results below. The total number of




Scenario 1 Basic 2.174 0.064
Scenario 2 ν = 0.54 2.024 0.053
Scenario 3 ν = 0.66 2.318 0.064
Scenario 4 Full wage 2.184 0.049
Scenario 5 AR(1) Aggregate shocks 2.258 0.119
Scenario 6 Low unobserved heterogeneity 2.281 0.081
Scenario 7 High unobserved heterogeneity 2.529 0.138
Scenario 8 Low unobserved heterogeneity and AR(1) shocks 2.343 0.122
Scenario 9 High unobserved heterogeneity and AR(1) shocks 2.551 0.175
Note: Results from various Monte Carlo experiments.(T = 10) and 10 sectors. We estimate C from the simulated data using
the estimator introduced in the paper.
We repeat the set of simulationsunder ninedifferent scenarios to as-
sess the identifying assumptions of our estimator. Results are reported
in Table 3. Scenario 1 is the basic scenario where we use the model
from the paper as is. We assume that the econometrician does not ob-
serve the NT sector wages. In row 1 of Table 3, we estimate C = 2.174.
This estimate is actually quite close to the true parameter C = 2.212
and they are in fact not statistically different.12 This basic scenario
thus confirms in simulations that our estimator can recover with a lot
of precision the true parameter of the model.
The first set of experiments that we explore with the Monte Carlo
simulations are intended to address the role of the normalization of ν.
Our estimator compares wage and employment fluctuations. If wage
differences are large but workers move little (i.e., the net flows are
small), thenwe estimate a high C, given our normalization of ν. Howev-
er, a large ν can also account for small employment responses to wage
fluctuations. The variance of the utility shock, ν, indicates how much
the workers value wage shocks vis-à-vis idiosyncratic utility shocks12 Note that ourMonte Carlowould notmatch C perfectly becausewe setN=500due to
computational constraints.
35E. Artuc et al. / Journal of International Economics 95 (2015) 28–41(net of the utility compensating differentials). A high ν implies a high
variance for these shocks and thus a lower weight on wage shocks. In
other words, when ν is large, theworkers care a lot more about the util-
ity shocks than about the wage shocks, so that the relative importance
of wage differences decreases. As a result, the employment response
to a given wage differential will be small.13
There is still the issue of the implications of normalizing ν. Even ifν is
the same across countries, it could be different from the adopted value
of 0.6. How different can it be and if so, can this affect the estimates of
C? To answer these questions, we use the Monte Carlo simulations as
follows. In Scenario 1, we simulated data with C = 2.212 and ν = 0.6
(and estimated the model using the simulated data and the normaliza-
tion ν= 0.6). In Scenarios 2 and 3, we use the simulated data from Sce-
nario 1, but sets ν= 0.54 and ν= 0.66, respectively, in the estimation.
The logic of these experiments is to check how robust C is if the normal-
ization of ν iswrong. In row2 of Table 3,we get C= 2.024,which is very
close to the true C. In row 3, we get C= 2.318, which is also close to the
true C. These simulations thus show that the estimation of the mobility
costs is robust to (small) departures of ν in a neighborhood of 0.6,
[0.54, 0.66].14
In Scenarios 4–9, we assess the other major identification assump-
tions in our estimator. In Scenario 4, we assume that the econometrician
observes the NT wages. In row 4 of Table 3, the estimate of C is 2.184.
This is closer to the true parameter C = 2.212 than the estimate in
Scenario 1 (which ignores the wage of the non-traded sector as in the
UNIDO data), and has a smaller standard error. Observing wages in
the NT sector helps because it adds information to the estimation
procedure.
In Scenario 5, we incorporate unobserved AR(1) aggregate shocks to
the wages, with variance 0.05 (approximately 5% of average wages,
which is close to the standard error of wage fluctuations in the U.S.
data) and persistence parameter 0.8. The shocks are unobserved by
the econometrician for the entire 10 year sample period. In this case,
the estimate of C is 2.258 (row 5) so that the baseline C is biased
down. This bias is not, however, very large.
Scenarios 6 to 9 add unobserved heterogeneity. In Scenario 6, we in-
corporate a synthetic version of Roy's self selectionmodel. To do this,we
assume that some workers have advantages in certain sectors.
Concretely, we work with reference worker type and 9 additional
types. These additional types have a 25% productivity advantage in
one sector relative to other sectors, (i.e. they are more productive in
that particular sector compared to other sectors, and earn 25% higher
wages than others if they choose that sector). We assume that each
type of workers is equally represented by 10% of the total mass L.
Types are unobserved and persistent. In row 6 of Table 3, the estimate
of C increases to 2.281. In Scenario 7,we allow for strongerworker spec-
ificity in their comparative advantage sector, namely we assume that
workers have a 50% productivity advantage. It is not surprising that,
with more significant worker heterogeneity, the estimate of C goes up
to 2.529. We finally combine the two Roy model experiments with
AR(1) aggregate shocks. In rows 8 and 9, we find that C increases to
2.343 and 2.551, respectively. All these Monte Carlo experiments
uncover some biases. In the worst case scenario (with large aggregate
shocks and strong heterogeneity) the bias is roughly about 15% of the
value of the estimate.13 Since we are normalizing ν for all countries, we are creating a hierarchy of countries
based on the labor mobility costs C, which is the average, common, cost of various labor
market frictions. Parameter ν is instead related to the idiosyncratic cost of those frictions.
If ν were more homogeneous across countries than C is, then the ranking of countries
based on our estimates is thus a reasonable ranking of labor market frictions.
14 In the Online Appendix, we perform additional robustness tests. In particular, we
show that the simulation results from our model are also robust to small departures from
the normalization of ν.5.2. Assessment using micro-data
We now assess the potential biases using micro-data from the U.S.
Current Population Survey (CPS). Let C∘ be the true value of C, and let
CW be our estimator. We can write
CW ¼ C∘ þ B1 þ B2 þ B3; ð13Þ
where B1 is the bias caused by aggregate shocks, B2 is the bias caused by
unobserved heterogeneity, andB3 is the bias (or noise) generated by our
treatment of the non-traded sector. The baseline to which we compare
our estimates is the MLE estimator of Artuc and McLaren (2014) and
Artuc, Bet, Brambilla and Porto (2014) using the U.S. CPS micro-data
(as described above). The estimate for the baseline is C∘ = 1.762 (with
a standard error of 0.288) and ν = 0.596.15 See Table 4. As it can be
seen, the estimates of C for the U.S. usingmicro data from the CPS or ag-
gregate data from UNIDO are not that different. In fact, given the esti-
mated standard errors, the estimates are not statistically different.
We can also improve these estimates by purgingwages fromworker
heterogeneity (observed in the CPS data but unobserved in the aggre-
gate data). To do this, we runMincer regressions of log wages on sector
dummies and worker characteristics (gender, marital status, education,
age) and use the coefficient on the sector dummies as wages in the
Artuc and McLaren (2014) estimator. This delivers ĈM
p = 1.636 and
ν = 0.60 (row 2 of Table 4). Note that worker heterogeneity creates
an estimated bias of 0.126 (around 7%) in the CPS and MLE method.
Given the standard error of 0.174, this bias is not statistically significant.
Using ν = 0.60 and our minimum distance estimator, we estimate C
for the U.S. with aggregated CPS data and we get ĈW = C∘ + B1 + B2 +
B3 = 2.081 (row 3 of Table 4). Comparing ĈW = 2.081 with ĈM
p
=
1.636, we calculate an overall estimated bias of 0.445, roughly equivalent
to 27% of C. The standard error of ĈW is 0.42, and consequently the
difference with ĈM is not statistically significant either.
To tell apart the different biases, we can first estimate C using our
method and purged wages from CPS (using a Mincer wage regression
as before). We estimate ĈW1 = C∘ + B1 + B3 = 1.643 so that, with our
procedure, the estimated bias created by unobserved heterogeneity is
B2 = 0.438. Furthermore, we can estimate a version of our model
where we include the non-traded sector wages and employment as ad-
ditional units of observations. This gives ĈW2 = C∘ + B1 + B2 = 1.946
(row 4 of Table 4). This pins down estimates for B3 = 0.135. And,
given B2 = 0.438, we pin down B1 = −0.128.
This means that worker heterogeneity that is unaccounted for in our
procedure creates a positive estimated bias of B2= 0.438. Thus, indeed,
unobserved heterogeneity can lead to spuriously large C in ourmodel. In
addition, our treatment of the non-traded sector in which we calibrate
u1 adds B3= 0.135 to the overall estimated bias. Ignoring labormobility
to the residual sector thus inflates our estimate of C. By contrast,
aggregate shocks drive our estimates down, with B2 = −0.128. Large
unforeseen aggregate shocks can make people move across sector
more, given the wage differentials, thus creating a spuriously lower C.
To conclude, these exercises uncover some of the biases that can
arise in our estimation procedure. The different estimators are not,
however, statistically different from one another. Consequently, the
presence of potential biases should not, we believe, prevent us from
using our estimates to assess trade policy (as we assess the cost of ad-
justment to trade in the following section). Rather, these caveats should
be acknowledged and some sensitivity analysis may be in order.
6. The estimates at work: simulating labor market responses
Our estimates of C have a high descriptive value, especially for devel-
oping countries. They can be used to characterize and assess differences
in labor market frictions across countries. In this section, we illustrate15 Recall that this is the baseline we used to derive the normalization of ν.
Table 4
Estimates of potential biases.
Aggregate shocks Unobserved heterogeneity Treatment NT sector Overall bias
C B1 B2 B3 B1 + B2 + B3
U.S. CPS data
Artuc & McLaren
Aggregate wage data (ĈM) 1.762
(0.288)




Baseline (ĈW = C + B1 + B2 + B3) 2.081
(0.422)
– – – 0.445
Purged wages (ĈW1 = C + B1 + B3) 1.643
(0.374)
– 0.438 – 0.445
With NT wages (ĈW2 = B1 + B2) 1.946
(0.423)
– – 0.135 0.445
Biases −0.128 0.438 0.135
U.S. UNIDO data
Artuc, Lederman, Porto 2.212
(0.526)
– – – 0.576
UNIDO data bias 0.131
Note: Assessment of biases in estimation. First panel shows consistent estimates of C usingU.S.micro-data from theCPS and theMLE estimator of Artuc andMcLaren (2014) andArtuc, Bet,
Brambilla and Porto (2014). The second row uses purgedwages from CPS usingMincer regressions. The Second panel uses the estimator proposed in Section 3 to U.S. aggregated CPS data.
The last panel shows the estimate of C for the U.S. using aggregate UNIDO data.
36 E. Artuc et al. / Journal of International Economics 95 (2015) 28–41how to use those same estimates to simulate labor market responses to
a trade shock and to derive measures of trade adjustment costs. Given
the limitations of our data, we work with simple simulations where
we shock the price of a sector. We focus on trade shocks to Food and
Beverages, but also show simulations to shocks in Textiles. We assume
that the price of these goods exogenously and unexpectedly decline
by 30% and we run independent simulations for all the countries in
our sample.16 All the results that follow should be taken as indications
of potential impacts of trade shocks and as a simple illustration of the
uses of our estimates of C.
To simulate the economy, we need to add more structure into our
model. We specify production and demand functions and we calibrate
the initial steady state of the economy. When the economy is hit by
the trade shock, we solve for the transition path to the new steady
state. Details on the structure of the simulations and the algorithms to
find the solutions are in Artuc et al. (2008, 2010).






where xg is the consumption of good g and θg is its share of total
expenditure. To be consistent across the paper, we work with nine
goods, eight traded goods and the non-traded residual sector. We
represent those preferences with data on budget shares compiled by
the International Comparison Program.17






where Qg is the physical output of good g, Ag is a technology parameter,
and Lg and Kg are labor and capital respectively. Labor is imperfectly
mobile because of the moving costs. Instead, capital is assumed to be
fixed as in Artuc et al. (2010).18 The parameters αg are approximated16 We donot attempt to develop a globalmodel of trade adjustment.We think about this
decline in prices as being generated, for instance, by a decline in the world demand for
food and thus in food international equilibriumprices. A globalmodel of trade is, however,
doable, if we impose heavy structure to a global model such as Hoekman and Olarreaga
(2008).
17 Details can be found at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ICPEXT/Resources/ICP_
2011.html.
18 See Artuc et al. (2014a) for simulations with imperfect capital mobility.with the share of thewage bill in value added at a sectoral level. Assum-
ing that each sector pays a wage equal to themarginal product of labor,
we then solve for the technology parameters (including differences in
capital)
eAg ¼ 1αg wgL1−αgg ; ð16Þ
where eAg ¼ AgK1−αgg . Note that there is an important difference in the
treatment of the traded and residual sectors. For the traded sectors,
the UNIDO data include wages and employment and thus we can easily
recoverÃg. For the residual sector, we only observe Lg. For the purpose of
the initial calibration, we thus set the wage to the average wage of the
economy.
We focus first on shocks to Food and Beverages. The transitional
dynamics of each country are interesting and revealing in themselves.
But rather than attempting to describe all these dynamics, we prepared
a typology of responses that are prevalent in our sample. In Fig. 5, we
illustrate the responses of employment allocations and wages for two
developing countries. Philippines, a country at the very top of the
labor mobility cost hierarchy with C = 5.06, is in the top panel. China,
a country with relatively low costs C = 2.75 for the developing world,
is at the bottom.19 Each graph shows six responses using solid lines
forwages and dashed lines for employment. The responses of the affect-
ed sector (Food and Beverages) are plotted with a thick line and the
responses of the residual sector, with a medium-thick line. To simplify
the presentation of the results, we aggregate all the remaining traded
sectors into one. These responses are plottedwith a thin line. To stream-
line the exposition, all our results are presented as proportional changes
relative to the initial steady state.
On impact, the real wage in Food and Beverages declines. The
decrease in food prices causes a loss of profitability in the sector that
translates one to one to nominal wages. There is also a decline in the
price index (CPI) that is proportional to the food share, which is less
than 1. Real wages in food thus decline. Real wages increase in the
rest of the economy, both in the residual sector and in other manufac-
tures, because of the increase in purchasing power (with constant
nominal wages and a lower CPI).
There are sizeable differences in these initial responses because the
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Fig. 5. Impacts of trade shock, high-C and low-C developing countries. Note: Simulations of responses to a 30% price decline in food and beverages. Each graph shows six responses using
solid lines for wages and dashed lines for employment. The responses of Food and Beverages are plotted with a thick line, the responses of the residual sector, with a medium-thick line,
and the responses of the remaining traded sectors, with a thin line. The graphs show proportional changes relative to the initial steady state.
37E. Artuc et al. / Journal of International Economics 95 (2015) 28–41a large food share implies a large reduction in the CPI and, consequently,
a smaller initial decline in realwages in the sector (independently of the
mobility costs). In Mauritania and Ethiopia, for example, the initial
decline in real wages is roughly 10%, and the food shares are 0.67 and
0.58, respectively. In the United States, where the food share is about
0.10, the initial drop in real wages is the largest, almost 25%. These
results for Mauritania and the United States can be seen in the top
panel of Fig. 6.
The resulting changes in intersectoral real wage differentials
create incentives for the workers to move away from the food sec-
tor. The real wage in the sector thus gradually starts increasing. In
many cases, real wages actually recover and are in fact higher in
the new steady state than in the initial steady state. This happens
when the recovery of the nominal wage during the transition out-
weighs (in absolute value) the decline in the CPI due to lower prices.
The recovery is consequently more likely to be observed in coun-
tries with low initial drop in real wages in Food and Beverages. For
instance, there is no recovery in many developed countries with
low food shares in the CPI (Austria, Germany, Finland, Ireland,
Netherlands and the United States).
We canmore clearly illustrate how themodelworkswith a diagram-
matical representation of a 2-sector economy (Artuc et al., 2014b). Fig. 7
shows the equilibrium. We plot the real marginal product of labor
curves in each sector. The initial equilibrium labor allocation (arbitrarily
chosen) occurs at point A, i.e. not at the intersection of the curves. Note
that this equilibrium is consistent with intersectoral wage differences
because of the presence of themobility costs.20 We illustrate the results
of the model with a decrease in the price of good 1. This makes the real
marginal product of labor curve shift down while the real marginal
product of labor curve in the other sector shifts up (this is because of
the decline in the CPI due to lower consumer price). The top panel of
Fig. 7 shows a case where the CPI weight of good 1 is relatively small.
In consequence, there is a (relatively) large initial decline in the real
wage in sector 1 (point B) and no steady state recovery (point C). The
bottom panel of Fig. 7 shows the case where the CPI weight of good 1
is larger. In this case, there is a less pronounced initial drop in real
wages in sector 1 (point B). In addition, real wages recover fully and
are actually higher in the post-shock steady state (point C).20 It should be pointed out, however, that thewage differential is not equal to themobil-
ity cost because of the idiosyncratic shocks. See the discussion in Artuc et al. (2014b).The recovery also depends on the costs of labor mobility and on the
slope of themarginal product of labor. A very low labor share in the pro-
duction of Food can create a very steep marginal labor product curve.
This implies that a given labor re-allocation away from the Food sector
generates a larger recovery of the equilibrium wage in the sector.21
There are, in fact, significant differences in the time it takes to recover.
We illustrate in the bottom panel of Fig. 6 the cases of Bangladesh
(left panel) and Bulgaria (right panel). Both countries have comparable
mobility costs, C = 4.89 and C = 4.69, respectively, but Bangladesh'
labor share in food is 0.17 and Bulgaria's is 0.35. As it can be seen,
Bangladesh recovers in 4 years while Bulgaria recovers in 11.
Employment in the shocked sector declines, as expected, because
firms shrink. As workers reallocate, employment in the other traded
sectors react proportionatelymuchmore than employment in the resid-
ual sector because the latter is typically very large. This also shows up in
the responses of sectoral wages, which, as already pointed out, increase
in both cases. The real wage in other traded sectors first increases, but
then declines. However, in no country are the responses reverted (so
real wages in the new steady state are always higher than in the initial
steady state). In the residual, non-traded sector, the initial increase in
real wage roughly perpetuates during the whole transition. This is so
for most countries and it is the consequence of the size of the sector.
Since the residual sector is very large, compared with other traded
sectors in these economies, the (often low) inflow of workers does not
affect equilibrium wages to a large extent.
Overall, thus, our findings suggest sluggish responses of the labor
market, especially in the affected sector, due to labor mobility costs.
This can also be seen by computing, for each country, the number of
years needed to converge to within 95% of the new steady state level
of real wages in Food and Beverages.22 The results are reported in
Fig. 8. Worldwide, the average convergence speed is 5.5 years, but it is
slower in developing countries (6.4 years) than in developed countries
(4.4 years). There is significant variation in speed. In Jordan, for
instance, it takes 12 years to reach 95% of the steady state; in
Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Latvia and Azerbaijan, 11 years; in the
Philippines, 10. By contrast, it takes only two years in Estonia, Finland,
Germany, Netherlands, Ireland, and the United States. As the graph
shows, the convergence speed steadily decreases with C.21 In the Online Appendix, we include a 2-sector diagrammatic representation, as in
Fig. 7, to explain the role of the slope of the marginal curve.
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Fig. 6. Impacts of trade shock. Note: Simulations of responses to a 30% price decline in food and beverages. Each graph shows six responses using solid lines for wages and dashed lines for
employment. The responses of Food and Beverages are plottedwith a thick line, the responses of the residual sector, with a medium-thick line, and the responses of the remaining traded
sectors, with a thin line. The graphs show proportional changes relative to the initial steady state.
23 We should nevertheless emphasize that a full welfare analysis of the gains from trade
is certainly possible in our framework. See our Online Appendix for additional welfare re-
sults. In a specific factor model, the specific factor gains if the price of the sector goes up
and loses otherwise. Consequently, after the decline in the price of Food and Beverages,
the real return to capital (or more generally the specific factor in the sector) will decline
and capitalist in the sector will lose. By contrast, capitalists in the rest of the economywill
gain. The real rewards to labor can increase or decrease depending on the response of the
nominal wage and on the weight of the price change in the consumer price index. Note
that, in ourmodel and in contrast to the standard specific factormodel, labor is imperfectly
mobile. This implies some degree of specificity in labor as well. As a result, the response of
the real wage will depend on the sector in which a worker is employed at the time of the
shock. Different welfare effects can thus be expected for different workers. In the Online
Appendix, we show the results for workers in non-foodmanufacturers and in the residual
sector.
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We can illustrate how to use ourmodel and our estimates of C to cal-
culate measures of welfare effects from trade and of trade adjustment
costs. It is important to note that we are not modeling the trade shocks
explicitly, but rather explore the consequences of a decline in the price
of a good—Food and Beverages—everywhere in the world caused, for
example, by a decline in aggregate demand of Food in developed
countries. Alternatively, we could model trade liberalization in each
country separately. In this case, the price of Food could increase for
net-exporting countries but could decrease for net-importing countries.
Performing this exercise requires a typification of countries in net-
exporters and net-importers. Here, we work with a simple setting of a
common shock to all countries in order to be able to show a set of
stylized responses to shocks in economies with different labor mobility
costs.
The total gains or losses from a trade shock can be calculated from
the induced changes in real factor rewards for all factors of produc-
tion. Since we work with a specific factor model with imperfect
labor mobility, the factors of production are the specific factors (in
all sectors) and the workers that earn sector-specific wages (due toC). Since calculating aggregate welfare effects requires additional as-
sumptions on the distribution of those specific factors, we focus in
what follows on the workers. Moreover, to more clearly illustrate
how C creates welfare effects and costs of trade adjustment, we
look at the welfare effects of trade shock for the workers in the af-
fected sector, i.e., Food and Beverages.23 As our measure of welfare,
we use the workers' values, given by Vt in Eq. (6), which is the pres-
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Fig. 7. Diagrammatic representation for a 2-sector economy. Notes. Illustration of the dy-
namic responses of the model for a 2-sector economy. The top panel depicts a case where
the good affected by the trade shock has a lowweight in the CPI. Realwages decline a lot in
the short run, then increase but never reach the pre-shock steady state. In the bottom
panel, the CPIweight of the good in question is higher. The initial drop in realwages is con-
sequently smaller, wages then increase and end up being higher in the post-shock steady
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Fig. 8. Convergence to steady state, number of years to within 95%. Notes: Convergence









Fig. 9. Trade adjustment costs. Notes: The gains from trade and trade adjustment costs. bti
be the instantaneous utility (including the option value of moving) of a worker in sector i
at time t, so that bti =wti + ηi + Ωti and Vti = bti + βVt + 1i . The potential gains from trade
are PG= A+ C, the actual gains are G= C− B and the trade adjustment costs are TAC=
A + B.
39E. Artuc et al. / Journal of International Economics 95 (2015) 28–41time t. Note that our model generates bilateral flows of workers be-
tween sectors during the transition and during the steady state—
the difference being that wages change in the transition but the
wage differentials are constant in the steady state. In consequence,
when we refer to trade adjustment costs for workers in Food and
Beverages, we are making a statement about a random worker that
may, or may not, switch sectors.
Let V0F and V∞F be the welfare of a worker in Food and Beverages in
the pre-shock and post-shock steady states. Let VF be the present
discounted value of the utility of a worker in the food sector along the
transition. The actual welfare effect of trade is given by
GF ¼ V F−V F0 : ð17Þ
The potential welfare effect of trade in the Food sector is instead
given by
PGF ¼ V F∞−V F0 : ð18Þ
The differences between the potential and the actual welfare effects of
trade in the food sector are caused by the costs of labor mobility,
which prevent the economy from instantaneously reaching thenew steady state. As in Davidson and Matusz (2010), this allows us to
estimate Trade Adjustment Costs, TAC, as:
TAC F ¼ V F∞−V F : ð19Þ
To help with the interpretation of these measures, we use Fig. 9,
which plots a hypothetical transition. Let bti be the instantaneous utility
(including the option value of moving) of a worker in sector i at time t,
so that bti =wti + η i+Ω ti and Vti = bti +βVt+ 1i . In the plot, the pre- and
post-shock values V0F and V∞F are the present discounted value of b0F and
bt
F, respectively. The scenario features positivewelfare effects from trade
(V∞F N V0F) and a transition path that shows an initial decline in welfare
and a later recovery. The potential welfare effects of trade are PGF =
A + C, the actual welfare effects are GF = C− B and TACF = A+ B.
The results for developing countries are reported in Table 5. Column
1 reproduces the level of mobility costs C. In columns 2 and 3, we show
the potential and the actual welfare effects of trade as a share of the
value in the initial steady state in the food sector. In our simulations,
the potential welfare effects of trade are always positive. Workers in
the food sector in all countries stand to gain from lower food prices
although the magnitudes vary widely, from a very low 1.49 or 1.71%
in Ireland and the United States, respectively, to almost 25% in
Table 5










Jordan 5.07 6.39 1.52 4.88 76.29 321.68
Philippines 5.06 10.38 5.23 5.15 49.59 98.36
Bangladesh 4.89 12.87 8.16 4.70 36.57 57.65
Mauritania 4.79 14.62 9.68 4.94 33.80 51.05
Bulgaria 4.67 5.61 0.34 5.27 94.01 1570.40
Ukraine 4.62 12.36 6.14 6.22 50.30 101.21
Latvia 4.58 5.92 0.37 5.54 93.69 1485.76
Ethiopia 4.52 7.45 4.80 2.64 35.51 55.07
Azerbaijan 4.47 24.55 18.89 5.66 23.05 29.96
Cameroon 4.2 7.36 4.36 3.00 40.82 68.97
Georgia 4.02 7.80 4.41 3.39 43.50 76.99
Lithuania 4 7.69 3.29 4.40 57.21 133.69
Colombia 3.96 6.76 3.53 3.23 47.74 91.35
Costa Rica 3.83 3.26 −0.27 3.53 108.29 −1306.43
Senegal 3.83 8.11 5.72 2.39 29.49 41.83
Ecuador 3.59 4.36 1.94 2.42 55.43 124.39
Chile 3.47 3.42 1.10 2.32 67.77 210.27
Indonesia 3.46 11.28 9.02 2.27 20.09 25.14
Egypt 3.4 7.18 4.86 2.31 32.23 47.56
Russia 3.28 11.01 8.20 2.81 25.54 34.31
Iran 3.24 6.94 5.00 1.93 27.88 38.66
Bolivia 3.2 5.29 3.71 1.58 29.87 42.59
Romania 3 9.13 7.11 2.02 22.10 28.37
Syrian Arab Republic 2.94 9.32 7.73 1.58 17.01 20.49
El Salvador 2.93 4.59 3.11 1.48 32.18 47.45
Kazakhstan 2.88 6.31 4.71 1.59 25.27 33.82
India 2.87 9.55 8.53 1.02 10.69 11.97
Mongolia 2.82 7.15 5.95 1.20 16.80 20.20
China 2.75 8.25 7.05 1.20 14.53 17.01
South Africa 2.68 6.20 5.02 1.18 19.00 23.46
Argentina 2.13 4.65 4.06 0.59 12.64 14.47
Note: Welfare effects of trade and trade adjustment costs for workers in the food sector
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Fig. 10. Trade adjustment costs and labor mobility costs. Notes: Correlations of estimates
of labor mobility costs C with estimates of trade adjustment costs.
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in the price of Food and Beverages causes potential welfare gains in
the food sector is twofold. As shown above, nominal wages in F&B de-
crease and this represents a welfare loss. However, as labor reallocates,
the real wage in the food sector recovers and, in many cases, actually
overshoots its initial steady state value. In addition, lower food prices
raise the real wage, not only in the food sector but also in other sectors
of the economy. In the model, the intertemporal welfare of a worker V
has two components, the real wage and the option value associated
with the probability of future labor choices (possibly implying a switch
of sectors). Thus, even though the real wage of a food worker may ini-
tially decline following the trade shock, the increase in the real wage
in the rest of the economy provides an option value that helps raise
overall welfare. Our results suggest that, for all countries, the new
steady state level of intertemporal welfare for a food worker is actually
higher than the pre-shock welfare. Among developing countries, the
potential welfare effects of trade for a food worker are equivalent to
8.12% of initial welfare.
The actual welfare effects of trade for food workers also tend to be
positive. They are also quite large: for developing countries, the welfare
impact of trade (as a share of initial welfare) is 5.15%. This is surprising
because of the initial drop in the real wage that we documented in
Fig. 5—which means that, along the transition, welfare first declines
but then recovers. The results from our simulations suggest that, in 54
out of 57 countries, the future gains from lower food prices more than
compensate the short-run losses (in terms of Fig. 9, area C is larger
than area A). Among developing countries, only Costa Rica would actu-
ally lose from lower prices. This is because the initial drop in welfare is
very pronounced (almost 20%) and the recovery takes a long time
(8 years). The actualwelfare effects of trade in the food sector are small-
er than the potential welfare effects of trade because of the costs of labormobility. In countries with low C (e.g., Finland or Germany) the differ-
ences are negligible, but in countries with high C, such as Jordan,
Philippines, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan, the differences can be sizeable.
In all countries, the trade adjustment costs TACF in the food sector are
positive. This can be seen in column 4 of Table 5, which shows TACF as a
share of initial values (always in Food & Beverages). In low-C countries,
and in fact in most developed countries, these costs are very low. As
expected, developing countries with higher C face much larger TACF.
In Ukraine, for instance, TACF are equivalent to 6.22% of the initial
welfare of a food worker. In Azerbaijan, Latvia, Bulgaria and Philippines,
TACFs are equivalent to 5.66, 5.54, 5.27 and 5.15% of initialwelfare, respec-
tively. In fact, Fig. 10 shows that the level of TACF increases with C. The
average TACF for developing countries is 2.98%.
In the literature, TAC is typically reported as a share of the totalwelfare
effect of trade (Davidson andMatusz, 2010). Thismeasure gives a sense of
the gains from trade that are forgone due to the costs of labor mobility.
We report TACF as a share of the potential and actual welfare impacts
from trade in columns 5 and 6. It is noteworthy that the costs of trade ad-
justment can represent a very large fraction of the gains from trade. In
countries where food workers actually lose from trade (Costa Rica,
Great Britain, and Australia), the ratio of TACF to potential gains is actually
greater than 1 (because area B is greater than area C). In all the remaining
countries, TACF are bounded by PGF. The share of TACF in PGF varies a lot,
and the average for developing countries is 41.06%.
The ratio of TACF to the actualwelfare effects for foodworkersGF can
vary widely as well. In Estonia or Finland, the ratios are lower than 10
because these economies can quickly enjoy the gains from trade as the
cost of adjusting labor, C, is relatively low. In other cases, TACF is huge.
In Bulgaria, TACF can be more than 15 times higher than the actual
welfare effects of trade, and in Chile more than twice as high. The aver-
age for developing countries is 118.9, so TACF and GF are similar, but the
median is 47.5. The size of TACF, in these cases, is dictated by the various
parameters of the model, not only by C. For instance, the ratios are
roughly the same in Mauritania, a country with one of the highest C,
as in Norway, a country with a low C. A large mobility cost makes
TACF large and GF small, so the ratio tends to be high in these cases.
But a large share of food prices in the CPI will create a large GF, for a
given TACF, and thus a lower relative importance of trade adjustment
costs.
Themodel allows us to shock prices in other sectors (aswell as other
parameters) and thus enrich the analysis. For example, an interesting
observation follows from shocking the textile sector. In the UNIDO
data, the textile sector tends to be larger than the food sector (in
terms of employment). In turn, the weight of Textiles and Clothing in
the consumer price index is much smaller than the weight of food. As
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Fig. 11. Overshooting in welfare losses. Textiles in Bangladesh. Notes: Simulation results
following a 30% price decline in Textiles in Bangladesh. The short run welfare loss over-
shoots thepost-shock steady state level ofwelfare, thus creating positive trade adjustment
costs even in the presence of losses from trade.
41E. Artuc et al. / Journal of International Economics 95 (2015) 28–41a result, there will be larger losses from wage responses in the textile
sector, and lower gains from CPI changes, thus conducing to welfare
losses, both actual and potential, across most countries. However, for
those countries, the trade adjustment costs in Textiles, TACT is positive.
This is interesting because it is often argued that, when there are
(potential) welfare losses from trade, factor adjustment costs can
actually protect workers in the short-run. In other words, when labor
is imperfectly mobile, the gradual adjustment to the steady state may
ameliorate the short-run losses associated with the loss of protection.
In our model, the short-run welfare loss of a textile worker overshoots
the post-shock steady state welfare level so that the short-run losses
are actually larger than the long-run losses. Fig. 11 presents the case of
Bangladesh. This implies positive TACT. In other words, textile workers
in Bangladesh are worse off under mobility costs, even if they would
lose in the frictionless model.
7. Conclusions
The premise of our paper is that, in the presence of labor market
frictions, trade shocks can have distinct dynamic effects on wages and
employment. To explore this idea, we proposed an estimator of labormo-
bility costs andwe built amap of those costs across the developingworld.
In line with the literature, we estimate large costs of labormobility, espe-
cially for developing countries. These costs, however, vary a lot across
countries. They are negatively correlated with various measures of devel-
opment (per capita GDP, educational attainments) and positively corre-
lated with other frictions, distortions and constraints in the economy.
Our estimates can be used to assess policies.We combined the struc-
tural model with the estimated labor mobility costs to simulate the re-
sponses of labor markets to trade shocks in developing countries.
These simulations allowed us to illustrate the interplay between labor
market frictions and trade shocks and to quantify the gains from trade
and the trade adjustment costs. We find that transitions are long,6 years on average, and longer in countries with higher mobility costs.
This creates trade adjustment costs that are typically large, and larger
for countries with higher costs.
We think about our estimates of labor mobility costs as a useful tool
for policy analysis. We show here that our model and estimator work
well with readily available aggregate data. Importantly, if more detailed
data could be compiled, the estimation and the simulation results can be
improved to account for workers heterogeneity (by for example
estimating different costs for skilled and unskilledworkers), to incorpo-
rate informality, or to better deal with the non-manufacturing sector.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2014.10.007.
References
Artuc, E. and J. McLaren (2014). “Trade Policy and Wage Inequality: A Structural Analysis
with Occupational and Sectoral Mobility”, mimeo World Bank and University of
Virginia.
Artuc, E., Chaudhuri, S., McLaren, J., 2008. Delay and dynamics in labor market adjustment:
simulation results. J. Int. Econ. 75 (1), 1–13.
Artuc, E., Chaudhuri, S., McLaren, J., 2010. Trade shocks and labor adjustment: a structural
empirical approach. Am. Econ. Rev. 100 (3), 1008–1045.
Artuc, E., G. Bet, I. Brambilla, and G. Porto (2014). “Trade Shocks and Factor Adjustment
Frictions: Implications for Investment and Labor”, mimeo Universidad de La Plata.
Artuc, E., Chaudhuri, S. and J. McLaren (2014). “Some Simple Analytics of Trade and Labor
Mobility”, mimeo World Bank.
Attanasio, O., Golberg, P., Pavcnik, N., 2004. Trade reforms and income inequality in
Colombia. J. Dev. Econ. 74, 331–366.
Coşar, A. K. (2013). “Adjusting to Trade Liberalization: Reallocation and Labor Market
Policies,” mimeo University of Chicago.
Coşar, A.K., Guner, N., Tybout, J., 2013. Firm dynamics, job turnover, and wage distribu-
tions in an open economy. NBER Working Papers 16326.
Davidson, C., Matusz, S.J., 2000. Globalization and labour-market adjustment: how fast
and at what cost? Oxf. Rev. Econ. Policy 16, 42–56.
Davidson, C., Matusz, S.J., 2004a. An overlapping-generations model of escape clause
protection. Rev. Int. Econ. 12, 749–768.
Davidson, C., Matusz, S.J., 2004b. International Trade and Labor Markets: Theory,
Evidence, and Policy Implications. W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Davidson, C., Matusz, S.J., 2006a. Long-run lunacy, short-run sanity: a simple model of
trade with labor market turnover. Rev. Int. Econ. 14, 261–276.
Davidson, C., Matusz, S.J., 2006b. Trade liberalization and compensation. Int. Econ. Rev. 47,
723–747.
Davidson, C., Matusz, S.J., 2010. In: Porto, G., Hoekman, B. (Eds.), Modeling, Measuring,
and Compensating the Adjustment Costs Associated with Trade Reforms.
Dix-Carneiro, R., 2014. Trade liberalization and labor market dynamics. Econometrica 82
(3), 825–885.
Galiani, S., Porto, G., 2010. Trends in tariff reforms and in the structure of wages. Rev.
Econ. Stat. 92 (3), 482–494.
Goldberg, P., Pavcnik, N., 2005. Trade, wages, and the political economy of trade
protection: evidence from the Colombian trade reforms. J. Int. Econ. 66, 75–105.
Goolsbee, A., Petrin, A., 2004. The consumer gains from direct broadcast satellites and the
competition with cable TV. Econometrica 72 (2), 351–381.
Hoekman, B., Olarreaga, M., 2008. Global Trade and Poor Nations. Brookings Institution
Press, Washington, DC.
Kambourov, G., 2009. Labour market regulations and the sectoral reallocation of workers:
the case of trade reforms. Rev. Econ. Stud. 76 (4), 1321–1358.
Lee, D., Wolpin, K., 2006. Inter-sectoral labor mobility and the growth of the service
sector. Econometrica 74 (1), 1–46.
McFadden, Daniel, 1973. Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior. In:
Zarembka, P. (Ed.), Frontiers in Econometrics. Academic Press, New York.
Menezes-Filho, N., Muendler, M., 2011. Labor reallocation in response to trade reform.
CESifo Working Paper (March).
Muendler, M., 2010. In: Porto, G., Hoekman, B. (Eds.), Trade Reform, Employment Alloca-
tion and Worker Flows.
Wacziarg, R., Wallack, J.S., 2004. Trade liberalization and intersectoral labour movements.
J. Int. Econ. 64, 411–439.
